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Abstract
I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for
general technologies of information acquisition. When posteriors satisfy two dimensional versions
of the standard First Order Stochastic Dominance and Concavity/Convexity of the Distribution
Function conditions, a rst-order approach is justied. Under the same conditions, informativeness
and riskiness of reports are equivalent. High powered contracts, that make the agents informational
rents more risky, are used to increase incentives for information acquisition, insensitive contracts
are used to reduce incentives for information gathering. The value of information to the agent is
always positive. The value of information to the principal is ambiguous.
JEL Classication: D82, D83, L51
Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Stochastic
Ordering, Copula, Value of Information
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1 Introduction
A vast literature on contracting and mechanism design has investigated the consequences of asym-
metric information on the e¢ ciency and distributive properties of allocations. In most of this
literature the models primitive is an information structure. However, in some economic problems
it is reasonable to assume that economic agents do only possess information because they expect
to make use of it. Moreover, their e¤ort to gather information is often unobservable to others.
Thus, an information acquisition technology rather than the information structure itself should be
taken as the models primitive, and contracts serve the double role of motivating the acquisition
of information and ensuring its truthful revelation. How does this second role a¤ect the nature of
optimal screening contracts?
Since Demski and Sappington (1987) have raised this question, many investigations have fol-
lowed. Notably, a prominent literature has investigated how optimal supply arrangements in pro-
curement should be changed to account for costs of acquiring information about cost-of-production
conditions (see, e.g., Crémer and Khalil (1992), Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a,b), Lewis and
Sappington (1997), Sobel (1993), and La¤ont and Martimort (2002) for a survey of these models).
More recently, I myself (Szalay (2005)) have analyzed how decision-making in an advisor-advisee
relationship should be structured to guarantee high quality advice.
The ndings of this literature are as follows. If the buyer in the procurement context wants
to make sure the seller is well informed, then he should o¤er high poweredincentive contracts.
Compared to a supply arrangement with a seller who is already well informed about his costs, the
seller will benet from an unusually high order if his marginal costs are lower than expected, but
he will also receive an exceptionally low order if his costs are higher than ex ante expected. As
a result, the quantity supplied is discontinuous and drops sharply when the sellers cost is higher
than ex ante expected. If the buyer does not want the seller to become informed, then the supply
arrangement should be rigid and should make little use of the sellers information. Both cases can
occur, depending on the cost of information acquisition and the timing of events.1 The structure of
decision-making in Szalays (2005) model of advice displays an exaggeration property that is akin
to a high powered incentive contract. If the advisor recommends an action that is higher than the
1This result depends on the absence of competition. Compte and Jehiel (2002) reinvestigate the case studied by
Crémer et al. (1998b) allowing many agents to compete. While Crémer et al. (1998b) showed that information
acquisition is socially wasteful, Compte and Jehiel (2002) show that it may become desirable again when agents
compete.
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ex ante expected action then the advisee takes an action that is even higher than the recommended
one; if the advisors proposed action is lower than the ex ante expected one, then the advisee takes
an even lower action. Similar to the procurement case, the decision schedule is discontinuous and
increases sharply at the prior mean.
Information acquisition in all these papers is of an all-or-nothing nature, where the person who
acquires information is in equilibrium either completely informed or does not receive additional
information at all. I raise a simple question: how do the insights of this literature depend on this
simplication?
I nd that super powered incentive contracts and exaggeration are general features of contracts
with endogenous information, discontinuities are not. To demonstrate these ndings, I develop
a general but still tractable model of information acquisition. Since the techniques I use can be
applied to a wide class of problems with endogenous information, the model is of interest well
beyond the context of procurement and the specic question I raise.
I study the procurement problem that Crémer et al. (1998a) have analyzed. A buyer wishes
to obtain parts from a seller. Neither the seller nor the buyer knows ex ante how costly it is to
produce these parts, say because they both engage in this particular kind of activity for the rst
time. The buyer begins by o¤ering a menu of contracts to the seller. Before the seller has to
accept or reject o¤ers he can acquire information about his costs. In contrast to Crémer et al.
(1998a), the seller can exert a continuous choice of e¤ort and receive a continuum of noisy signals.
An increase in the sellers e¤ort improves the quality of the signal he receives stochastically. Both
the sellers choice of e¤ort and the signal he receives are known only to him but not to the buyer.
After the seller has observed a signal he either accepts one of the contracts or walks away without
further sanction. The seller learns the true cost of production only when he produces.
Allowing for a continuous quality of noisy information introduces considerable technical di¢ cul-
ties, and one of the contributions of this paper is to demonstrate an elegant way over these hurdles.
A rich model of information acquisition leads naturally into a problem of multi-dimensional screen-
ing. Ex post, when the seller has acquired a noisy signal, his entire posterior, a multi-dimensional
object, may be relevant for contracting. Thus, the buyer faces a problem of multi-dimensional
screening, which is potentially quite nasty to solve2 . However, when the sellers utility is linear
in his information variable (e.g., his constant marginal costs), then the sellers preference over
2See McAfee and McMillan (1988) for a screening problem where types have more dimensions than the principal
has screening instruments available. See also Armstrong and Rochet (1999) and Rochet and Stole (2003) for
overviews of multidimensional screening problems.
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contracts depends e¤ectively only on the mean calculated from the posterior distribution. Since
this is a one dimensional statistic, the problem at the reporting stage is reduced to the well known
one-dimensional screening problem. To understand the sellers ex ante problem of how much e¤ort
to invest in information acquisition, one has to study the dependence of the ex ante distribution
of the conditional expectation on e¤ort. One can resort to standard di¤erentiability methods to
describe the optimal amount of e¤ort spent on information acquisition only if the sellers e¤ort
inuences the ex ante distribution of the conditional mean in a particular way. The sellers optimal
choice of information acquisition is adequately described by a rst-order condition for any contract
that ensures truthful communication of information, if the sellers e¤ort increases the riskiness
of the ex ante distribution of the posterior expectation at a decreasing rate, where riskiness is
understood in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).3
The second contribution of this paper is to provide statistical foundations for increasing risk
at a decreasing rate in the distribution of conditional expectation in terms of the primitives of
the experiment structures. I obtain an inuence of the desired sort when I impose the following
assumptions. First, the marginal distributions of signals and true costs are given and the sellers
e¤ort inuences only the joint distribution of these two variables.4 Second, for signals below the
prior expected signal value, an increase in e¤ort increases the posterior in the sense of First Order
Stochastic Dominance (FOSD), and the posterior is concave in signal and e¤ort. For signals above
the prior expected signal value, an increase in e¤ort decreases the posterior in the sense of FOSD
and the posterior is convex in signal and e¤ort.
It is interesting to contrast these conditions with those used to justify the traditional rst-order
approachin problems of pure moral hazard (Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt (1988)). My conditions
are two dimensional versions of the standard FOSD and Convexity/Concavity of the Distribution
Function condition (CDFC). Moreover, the qualitative impact of e¤ort on the posterior is reversed
as the signal is increased above its expected value. For this reason I term my conditions mean
reversing FOSD and CDFC, respectively. The rationale for having mean reversing rather than
3Note that this notion of riskiness is somewhat di¤erent from Blackwells, which states that one information
structure is Blackwell-better than another if it gives rise to a more risky distribution of the posterior. Riskiness of
the posterior expectation is a less restricting condition. Heuristically, while Blackwell requires the distribution of all
moments to be more risky, the present concept requires only that the distribution of the rst moment is more risky.
The di¤erence arises because I impose restrictions on the sellers utility function, while Blackwells criterion orders
information structures for all decision makers whose utility function belongs to a class. For more recent approaches
that order information structures, see Karlin and Rubin (1956), Lehmann (1988), and Athey and Levin (2001).
4A statistical structure of essentially this type is called a copula (see, e.g. Nelsen (2006))).
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standard FOSD and CDFC is that the latter imply changing means (Milgrom (1981)), which is a
rather undesirable feature of a model of information acquisition; the law of iterated expectations
requires that the means be independent of the amount of information acquisition. My conditions
are less restrictive than the ones used to justify the traditional rst-order approach. In problems
of pure moral hazard one has to ensure the monotonicity of contracts by imposing in addition
the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), which makes the specication overall rather
restrictive. In contrast, there is no need to ensure the monotonicity of contracts when there is
adverse selection, because monotonicity of contracts is a necessary condition for implementability
(Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984)). Therefore, it is fair to say that the rst-order approach goes
through more easily than in a problem of pure moral hazard.
A second statistical model that delivers the same reduced form is a stochastic experiment
structure that is similar in nature to the spanning condition studied in Grossman and Hart (1983).
In that specication, an experiment is the realization of two independent random variables; a signal
which follows a given marginal distribution and an informativeness parameter whose distribution
depends on the agents e¤ort. The posterior satises a mean reversing version of MLRP; for signals
above the mean, a posterior arising from a relatively more informative experiment places relatively
more weight on the high realization of costs, for signals below the mean, it places relatively more
weight on the low realizations of costs. Finally, an increase in e¤ort makes it more likely to observe
a more informative experiment in the sense of FOSD, and the distribution of informativeness
satises a CDFC condition.
The main insight arising from this analysis is that informativeness and risk are equivalent in any
tractable model. It is in fact this equivalence result that explains the ndings of the literature on
the value of information and the structure of optimal contracts. The value of information depends
on the sellers and the buyers attitudes towards risk, that is, the shape of their indirect utility
functions. It is well known that only convex indirect utility proles of the seller are implementable
(see Rochet (1985)). Thus, incentive compatibility makes the seller a quasi-risk lover so that he
always likes to have more information. In contrast, the shape of the buyers indirect utility function
is a more complex issue. It depends both on his direct utility function and the distribution of types.
More information can either be a blessing or a curse to the buyer5 , and I provide su¢ cient conditions
for both cases. Similarly, the structure of the optimal supply arrangement is more risky than its
exogenous information counterpart when the buyer provides the seller with extra incentives for
5This conrms results of Green and Stokey (1981), who do, however, not relate their results to risk.
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information acquisition, and is less risky when the buyer reduces the sellers incentives to acquire
information. In the former case, when the sellers expected cost is surprisingly low he is rewarded
by an extra increase in production that increases his informational rent at the margin, and punished
if his expected cost is surprisingly high. These results conrm and generalize those of Crémer et
al. (1998a) and eliminate the undesirable discontinuity in their supply arrangement due to the
all-or-nothing nature of information acquisition. But the analysis is of use beyond that context
and can be applied to any model that relies on a linear environment.
Ordering better information by riskiness in the distribution of conditional expectations is an
extremely useful concept. In contemporaneous work, Dai and Lewis (2005) have studied a model
of sequential screening with two possible levels of precision of information that obey this ordering.
They show that experts with di¤erentially precise information can be screened by the extent of
decision authority embodied in contracts. As in the present paper, the value of information to the
principal is ambiguous. However, they show that this ambiguity can be overcome by varying the
timing structure of the interaction between the principal and the expert. Dai and Lewis (2005)
and the present paper complement each other. While their aim is to develop a model that is
easily tractable, the current paper provides general statistical foundations for the reduced form
they employ and thereby conrms the generality of their ndings. Moreover, the justication of
the rst-order approach in terms of the primitives of the experiment structure is a novelty of my
model. More recently, Shi (2006) has studied information acquisition in optimal auctions showing
how the optimal reserve price is a¤ected by the fact that information is endogenous. Shi studies
information structures that are rotation ordered, a concept that Johnson and Myatt (2006) have
used to study general transformations of demand. The information structures used in this paper
satisfy the rotation order. In contrast to Shi (2006), this paper derives more general statistical
foundations in terms of experiment structures that induce the desired ordering in the ex ante
distribution of conditional expectations.
Closest related to the present paper in terms of its aim to uncover the general principles of
information acquisition are Gromb and Martimort (2004) and Malcomson (2004). Gromb and
Martimort (2004) establish the Principle of Incentives for Expertise, according to which an agent
should be rewarded when his advice is conrmed either by the facts or by the advice of other
agents. There are two main di¤erences to the present paper. First, their setup is simpler on the
informational side but richer on the organizational side, in that they allow for multiple agents.
Second, they allow for contracting contingent on advice and ex post realizations whereas I focus
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on the case where the agents information is not veriable ex post. Malcomson (2004) analyzes the
standard principal agent problem, where the agent not only exerts some e¤ort but also makes a
decision. The main di¤erence to the present paper is the role of communication. I allow for com-
munication while Malcomson considers the case where the principal commits to a single contract
in advance. Moreover, Malcomsons main interest is in characterizing conditions under which the
addition of the agent acquiring a signal makes the problem and its solution any di¤erent from the
standard principal agent problem, and its solution, respectively. In contrast, the present approach
allows for a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism.
Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) analyze incentives for information acquisition in ex post e¢ -
cient mechanisms. They show that incentives for information acquisition in a private value envi-
ronment are related to supermodularity in the agentspayo¤ functions.6 In contrast to the present
paper contracts are only proposed after information has been acquired. As a result, information
acquisition may be either excessive or insu¢ cient although the sellers payo¤ function in the present
model is submodular in the state and the contracting variable.
The information structures used in the present paper connect the contracting literature to
a literature on the value of information in decision problems, a line of research that has been
initiated by Blackwell (1951), and Karlin and Rubin (1956), and further pursued by Lehmann
(1988), and most recently by Athey and Levin (2001). The combination of these two literatures
delivers a powerful approach, that should prove useful to study further applications, because the
predictions of the model are robust within a large class of information gathering technologies. One
such application, already pursued by Shi (2006), is the study of optimal auctions with endogenous
information (see Myerson (1981) for the case of exogenous information). His approach nicely
complements the literature on auctions with endogenous information that has restricted attention
to a class of mechanisms, e.g., rst versus second price auctions (see Tan (1992), Hausch and Li
(1993), Stegemann (1996), and more recently Persico (2000) on this).7
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I spell out the main model. Section 3 contains the
main result on the validity of the rst-order approach. Section 4 derives the statistical foundation
of the second order stochastic dominance relation in the distribution of the conditional expectation.
Sections 5 and 6 contain the main implications of the theory. Section 5 derives some results on
the value of information, section 6 discusses the form of optimal contracts. Section 7 derives two
6They note that e¢ cient mechanisms in the linear environment can be based on conditional expectations.
7Persicos result that the auction format with the higher risk sensitivity induces more information acquisition
corresponds to the result that the marginal value of information for the agent is positive.
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alternative formulations of experiments. In the rst variation, I allow for moving supports, and
show that the rst-order approach is typically not valid in this framework but would deliver - if
valid- essentially the same structural predictions except for distortions at the top. The second
variation provides a particularly useful simplication of the main model which I term stochastic
experiment structure. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
The model is a variant of the Baron and Myerson (1982) model where I allow for general, endoge-
nous information structures. A buyer (henceforth the principal) contracts with a seller (henceforth
the agent) for the production of a good. The good is divisible, so output can be produced in
any quantity, q: q is observable and contractible. The agent receives a monetary transfer t from
the principal and has costs of producing the quantity q equal to q. Both parties are risk neu-
tral with respect to transfers. The principal derives gross surplus V (q) from consumption; where
V (q) is dened on [0;1) and satises the conditions8 Vq (q) > 0; Vqq (q) < 0; limq!0 Vq (q) =
1; limq!1 Vq (q) = 0: Thus the principals net utility is
V (q)  t:
The agents payo¤ from receiving the transfer t and producing the amount q is given as
t  q:
Ex ante the principal and the agent do not know the precise value of ; but share a common
prior about it, which is supported on

; 

with cdf P () ; where  > 0: Once the principal has
committed himself to the terms of the contract but before production takes place, the agent may
acquire additional information about : Information acquisition is modeled as a costly choice of
e¤ort e, that inuences the informativeness of certain experiments.
An experiment is a joint distribution of  and and a random variable :This distribution
depends on the agents e¤ort. The marginal distributions of  and  are both independent of
e; so e¤ort inuences only the joint distribution of the two variables (so roughly speaking the
correlation between the two variables) but not their marginal distributions9 . The random variable
8Throughout the paper subscripts will denote derivatives of functions with respect to their argument.
9The assumption that the marginal of  is independent of e will be important for the results in sections 4 through
6, but is not needed for the results in section 3. Since the changes to incorporate the case where the marginal of 
depends on e are minor, I leave it to the reader to explore this extension.
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 has typical realization  2 [; ] ; and follows a distribution with an arbitrary density k () > 08
and cdf K () : Since the distribution of  has full support, K (), contains the same information
as  does itself, but is much more convenient to work with. So, I denote the random variable
S = K () as the signal. As is well known, S is distributed on a support [s; s] = [0; 1] and follows
a uniform distribution, regardless of the function K ().10
I let H (j s; e) denote the resulting posterior cdf and let h (j s; e) denote the density of the
posterior distribution, and assume that this density is di¤erentiable in s and e to the order needed.
Experiments can be ordered in the sense that high values of s indicate high costs in the sense of
First Order Stochastic Dominance; for  2  ;  the posterior distribution satises
 1 < Hs ( js; e ) < 08s; e: (1)
For  2 ; 	 ; Hs ( js; e ) = 0 for 8s; e: (1) implies that R  dH (j s; e) is increasing in s
with a bounded rate of change: Below I will also introduce a precise sense in which higher e¤ort
corresponds to more informative experiments. For the time being this is not important and the
only restriction I impose on the inuence of e¤ort on H (j s; e) is
He (j s; e) = He (j s; e) = 08; e (2)
(1) and (2) imply that there is a lowest and a highest estimate of costs conditional on the agents
information and these bounds are both independent of the level of e¤ort the agent exerts. For-
mally,
R 

dHe (j s; e) =
R 

dHe (j s; e) = 0: This property is convenient because the relevant
contracting variable will have a xed support.
The cost of e¤ort is g (e) ; a strictly convex function, that satises ge(e) > 0 for e > 0; gee(e) > 0
for all e; ge(0) = 0; and lime!e ge(e) = 1; where e is an upper bound on e that can be taken as
innite most of the time, except for some specic examples.
The game has the following time structure:
10This approach to model dependence among random variables is closely related to the notion of a copula, dened
as the distribution function C (P () ;K () ; ) on [0; 1]2 : The marginal distributions of P and K are uniform on
[0; 1], regardless of the functions P () and K () themselves. The function C () embodies the correlation structure
between the random variables. In the present context, it is more convenient to specify the joint distribution over 
and K () : Otherwise the structure is the same.
10
   +   
P o¤ers
amenu of
contracts
   +    +    
A exerts
e¤ort e
s is realized
and observed
by A
  +    
A accepts
a contract
or refuses
to participate
   +     
A produces
and delivers
and learns the
true costs 
only when producing
First, the principal o¤ers a menu of contracts. Then the agent chooses an e¤ort level, e; that
determines the informativeness of the experiment. The experiment is realized and observed by
the agent. Given this information he decides whether or not to participate, and, contingent on
participating, also which contract to accept. If the agent refuses to participate the game ends. If
the agent agreed to participate, production and transfers take place according to the contract the
agent has chosen. Notice that the agent learns the true cost only at the time when he produces, not
before. In particular, he does not know the true cost when he selects any of the o¤ered contracts
or his outside option. I assume that the agents choice of e¤ort is not observable to the principal
and that the value of the signal is the agents private knowledge.
3 Justifying a First Order Approach
As is customary, I will characterize solutions to the contracting problem taking as given that the
principal whishes to implement a given level of e¤ort, and will say very little about the optimal
choice of e¤ort to implement11 .
I think of contracting in terms of mechanism design. A mechanism is a tuple fq(); t()g which
species quantities of production and transfers to the agent as a function of a (vector valued)
message m; the agent sends to the principal. Invoking the Revelation Principle I can restrict
attention to direct, incentive compatible mechanisms, fq(); t()g that depend only on a reported
tuple of signal realization and value of e¤ort (s^; e^) : Hence, one can write the principals problem
11As is well known from Grossman and Harts (1983) analysis of the problem of pure moral hazard, the principals
problem can be broken into two subproblems: a rst problem which consists of nding the least costly way to
implement a given e¤ort choice, and a second one, building on the solution of the rst, to select the optimal e¤ort
level for the agent. While the rst problem provides rich insights into the structure of optimal contracts, the second
one has very little structure; in particular, the principals optimization problem with respect to the agents e¤ort is
not generally concave in the choice variable. Due to this lack of regularity structure, the literature generally connes
attention to the rst part of the problem, and I follow this tradition here.
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as follows:
max
q(;); t(;)
Z s
s
(V (q (s; e))  t (s; e)) ds (3)
s.t.
8s; e :
Z 

(t (s; e)  q (s; e)) dH ( js; e ) 
Z 

(t (s^; e^)  q (s^; e^)) dH ( js; e ) 8s^; e^ (4)
Z 

(t (s; e)  q (s; e)) dH ( js; e )  08s; e (5)
e 2 argmax
e
(Z s
s
 Z 

(t (s; e)  q (s; e)) dH ( js; e )
!
ds  g (e)
)
(6)
(4) requires that the agent nds it optimal to report the true signal value and the true signal
informativeness. (5) ensures that the agent nds it optimal to participate for all possible realizations
of signal and informativeness. (6) imposes that the agents choice of how much e¤ort to acquire is
optimal given the contract the principal o¤ers. Observe that the agents ex ante expected utility
net of costs of information acquisition is always nonnegative. Notice that I impose (5) for all values
of s and e; not only the equilibrium choice of e¤ort. This involves no loss of generality under the
non-moving support assumption. Extensions to the case of moving supports will be studied below.
The screening problem is multi-dimensional, and therefore potentially extremely complicated.
However, due to the fact that the agents utility is linear in ; and linearity is preserved under expec-
tations, the agents utility depends e¤ectively only on the one-dimensional statistic
R 

dH ( js; e )
(and the agents reported type). For this reason, similar to Biais et al. (2000) in a di¤erent context,
I can observe that non-stochastic mechanisms can only make use of this one dimensional statistic
of the type instead of the two-dimensional type itself.12 Since the agents conditional expectation
is the relevant contracting variable it is important to understand the properties of this variable.
Denote the function
 (s; e) =
Z 

dH ( js; e )
Suppose that  (s; e) =  for some real number : Given that  (s; e) is increasing in s; the function
is invertible and the signal that generated a value of the conditional expectation equal to  satises
s =  1 (; e) : Ex ante, i.e., before s is realized, the value of the conditional expectation is a
random variable itself,  say. Using the fact that the distribution of s is uniform, the cdf of  for
12Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) have noted that this is also the relevant contracting variable in ex post e¢ cient
mechanisms in the linear environment, since e¢ cient mechanisms are non-stochastic.
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given e is
F (; e) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for  <  (s; e)
 1 (; e) for  (s; e)     (s; e)
1  >  (s; e) :
(7)
Due to condition (2), the support of  is the interval

; 

; independent of e¤ort. Formally, I have
 =  (s; e) for all e and  =  (s; e) for all e: Together with the law of iterated expectations, the
non-moving support property places some restrictions on the inuence of e on F (; e) : Dene EX
as the expectation operator when the expectation is taken with respect to X. The law of iterated
expectations requires that ES [E [j s; e]] = E [] : Changing variables and integrating by parts,
I can write
ES [E [j s; e]] =   
Z 

F (; e) d:
This property must hold for any e: Since E [] is independent of e; it follows thatZ 

Fe (; e) d = 0: (8)
(8) is a condition that any model with xed supports must full. If (8) fails to hold, then an increase
in e¤ort changes the ex ante mean of the distribution, which implies that e¤ort is not purely a
measure of informativeness but also of something else. It is obvious that the same conditions imply
also that Z 

Fee (; e) d = 0: (9)
Finally, notice that condition (1) implies that the distribution of  has a density f (; e) which is
strictly positive on

; 

: To see this, di¤erentiate (7) ; with respect to ; using the inverse function
theorem, to get
f (; e) =
8><>:
1
s( 1(;e);e)
> 0 for  2 ; 
0 otherwise.
(10)
I now use this change of variables to state (3) s.t. (4) ; (5) and (6) ; equivalently as a message game
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with messages ^ 2 ;  about perceived costs. In this formulation, the principals problem is
max
q(); t()
Z 

 
(V (q ())  t ()) f (; e) d
s:t:
t ()  q ()  t

^

  q

^

8; ^
t ()  q ()  08
e 2 argmax
e
8<:
Z 

 
(t ()  q ()) f (; e) d   g (e)
9=;
In order to solve this problem I need to be able to replace the nal constraint by a rst-order
condition.
Proposition 1 The principals problem (3) s.t. (4) ; (5) and (6) is equivalent to the following
problem
max
q()
Z 


V (q ()) 

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

q ()

f (; e) d (11)
+
 Z 

Fe (; e) q () d   ge (e)
!
s:t:q () non-increasing
for some Lagrange multiplier  if an increase in e induces a mean preserving spread in the sense
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), at a decreasing rate, in the sense thatZ y

Fe (; e) d  08y (12)
and (8) ; and Z y

Fee (; e) d  08y (13)
and (9) ; and in addition either q () is continuously di¤erentiable for all  or the inuence of the
agents e¤ort on the density of  is bounded below by the uniform density on

; 

fe (; e)    1   8: (14)
It is well known13 that the set of implementable contracts satises t() = q() +
R 

q()d
and q () non-increasing in : Substituting out transfers and integrating by parts one obtains
13For convenience of the reader the derivation is reproduced in the appendix. A more detailed treatment is found
in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chap 7.
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the principals objective function: the principal maximizes expected surplus net of the agents
virtual surplus (Myerson (1981)). Substituting the same expression for transfers into the agents
objective function, the agents expected utility, gross of costs of information acquisition, becomesR 

R 

q()dfe (; e) d: It is easy to see that the function
R 

q()d is decreasing and (weakly)
convex. In other words, the agent is a quasi-risk lover because his indirect utility under any
implementable contract is a convex function of  (Rochet (1985)). Therefore he likes increases
in risk in the distribution of types in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)14 , so given (12)
and (8) ;
R 

R 

q()dfe (; e) d > 0 for all e. In the appendix, I demonstrate that - provided
the technical condition (14) is satised - the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) result implies also
that the agents expected utility is concave in e¤ort, so
R 

R 

q()dfee (; e) d < 0 for all e:
The technical restriction is needed to deal with issues of non-di¤erentiability in q () ; which may
arise from bunching. However, to capture the intuition for the result, suppose these problems are
absent and that
R 

q()d is twice continuously di¤erentiable so that I can integrate by parts twice.
Proceeding like this, I can express the agents rst-order condition as
 
Z 

Z 

Fe ( ; e) dq () d   ge (e) = 0: (15)
From (15) it is easy to see that (12) renders the agents expected gross utility (gross of costs of
information acquisition) non-decreasing in e for any non-increasing quantity schedule; (13) renders
the agents expected gross utility concave in e. The complete proof, which does not rely on the
absence of bunching, is in the appendix.
The upshot of proposition 1 is that one can complement the Mirrlees approach to reporting
by a rst-order approach to information acquisition, which yields a fairly easily tractable problem.
Before I proceed to apply the approach to the specic context of procurement, I characterize su¢ -
cient conditions on the Bayesian updating process that induce Second Order Stochastic Dominance
shifts in the distribution of :
4 On the Informativeness of Experiments
In this section I study the properties of the distribution of the conditional expectation. I obtain
su¢ cient conditions on the conditional distribution of  given s and e such that the distributions
of the conditional expectation for di¤erent levels of e can be ordered by Second Order Stochastic
14See also Dai and Lewis (2005), who have observed this independently in a two experiment model.
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Dominance, that the shift in the distribution due to an increase in e¤ort satises the decreasing
returns condition, and that the distribution has an increasing inverse hazard rate.
Recall that a high signal indicates a high  in the sense of (1): This sort of dependence arises
naturally if, e.g.,  and s are a¢ liated. Consider now the dependence on e: Let ~s  ESS denote
the expected value of the signal s: To obtain my rst result, I impose a mean reversing FOSD
condition, that I shall denote MRFOSD henceforth. For all e and all  2  ;  :
He ( js; e ) > 0 for s 2 (s; ~s) and He ( js; e ) < 0 for s 2 (~s; s) : (16)
The posterior distributions for di¤erent levels of e and for a given realization of s are ordered
by First Order Stochastic Dominance. However, the direction into which higher e¤ort shifts the
posterior distribution depends on whether the signal realization is above or below its mean. More
precisely, the sign of the inuence of an increase in e on the posterior is reversed as s is increased
above its mean value. The reason I impose this condition in a mean reversing rather than the
usual global sense is because a global version of (16) would imply that for each s an increase in
e increases the posterior. But since the distribution of the signal is xed, this would imply an
increase in the ex ante mean, which is inconsistent with the law of iterated expectations.
Let ~   (~s; e) ; the conditional mean induced by the expected signal. Experiments that satisfy
condition (16) induce the desired ordering in the distribution of the conditional expectation:
Proposition 2 Assume that experiments satisfy (1), (2) ; and (16) : Then, F (; e) satises
Fe (; e) = Fe

~; e

= Fe
 
; e

= 0;
Fe (; e) > 0 for  2

; ~

; and
Fe (; e) < 0 for  2

~; 

and thus condition (12) :
We know from (7) that the properties of the distribution function F (; e) simply correspond
to the properties of the inverse of the conditional expectation function. Relative to ~ the agent
revises his posterior expectation upwards if he receives a signal higher than ex ante expected, and
downwards if he receives a downward surprise. If he receives the expected signal, the conditional
expectation is equal to ~: The upward (downward) revision for surprisingly high (low) signals is
the larger the higher is e: As a consequence the conditional expectation functions for di¤erent e
all cross three times, at  =  (s; e) ; at  =  (s; e) ; and at ~; and the ex ante distributions of 
16
satisfy a triple crossing property: It s natural to think of ~ as being equal to E: This property
necessarily holds if the signal contains no information for e = 0; because this a¤ords that the
distribution of  converges to a mass point around the prior mean when e goes to zero. I will
assume this property holds henceforth, thus E = ~:
Before I illustrate these results with an example, I give an alternative su¢ cient condition on the
posteriors that justify condition (12) in proposition 1. Although more restrictive, this condition
may prove useful in other applications, because it implies more structure. In particular, one may
impose a mean reversing version of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property:
@
@

he ( js; e )
h ( js; e )

< 0 for s 2 (s; ~s) and @
@

he ( js; e )
h ( js; e )

> 0 for s 2 (~s; s) : (17)
If the conditional distribution satises condition (17) and the agent receives a signal which is
higher (lower) than ex ante expected, then it is relatively more likely that indeed the state is
high (low) for a higher level of e: In this sense the signal is more informative when e¤ort is
higher. Non-moving supports and di¤erentiability in s then require then that @@

he(js;e )
h(js;e )

= 0
for s 2 fs; ~s; sg : Building on the proofs of Milgrom (1981) it is straightforward to show that this
mean reversing version of the MLRP condition implies (16) : Moreover, one can also show that
under these assumptions the distribution of  inherits the Mean Reversing Monotone Likelihood
Ratio Property, i.e., one has @@

fe(;e)
f(;e)

T 0 for  T ~:15 However, as is well known (Jewitt (1988)),
joint conditions on the likelihood ratios and the convexity properties of the distribution function -
which I will introduce shortly - are rather restrictive. Therefore, I use the weaker condition (16) :
The following simple example illustrates the properties.
Example 1 Let the marginal cost be  = B +  for some B > 1 and let the marginal of
 be uniform on [ 1; 1] ; the marginal of s be uniform on [0; 1] ; and the posterior density be
h (j s; e) = 1+y(s;e)2 for  2 [ 1; 1] and zero otherwise. The function y (s; e) is given by
y (s; e) = s  12 + k

s
 
s  12

(1  s) + les2  s  123 (1  s)2 ; where  2 (0; 1) ; and k; l; and e
(the upper bound on e¤ort) are positive and su¢ ciently small. Then, h (j s; e) > 0 for all ;Z 1
 1
h (j s; e) d = 1; and the posterior expectation,  (s; e) = B + y(s;e)3 ; satises the law of
iterated expectations.
With a slight departure from my notation, I take  instead of  as the underlying ran-
dom variable. The posterior cdf and its derivative with respect to e¤ort can be computed as
15This last statement follows directly from Milgroms (1981) proposition 3.
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H (j s; e) = +12 + ()
2 1
4 y (s; e) and He (j s; e) = ()
2 1
4 ye (s; e) ; respectively: The func-
tion ye (s; e) embodies the important assumptions I have made sofar. ye (s; e) takes a value of zero
for s 2 0; 12 ; 1	 ; a negative value for s 2  0; 12 and a positive value for s 2   12 ; 1 : Therefore, an
increase in e increases the posterior cdf (and therefore decreases the conditional expectation) for
low signal values and decreases the posterior cdf for high values, precisely as required in (16) : In
fact, the example also satises (17) as @@

he(js;e )
h(js;e )

= ye(s;e)
(1+y(s;e))2
:
To obtain the second result, I impose a mean reversing concavity/convexity condition of the
distribution function, that I shall denote MRCDFC henceforth. For all  2  ;  :
H ( js; e ) is concave in (s; e) for s 2 (s; ~s) and convex in (s; e) for s 2 (~s; s) : (18)
The reason to impose a mean reversing rather than a global concavity/convexity assumption is the
same as for condition (16) : The assumption that supports are non-moving, (2), directly implies that
Hee (j s; e) = Hee (j s; e) = 0: Therefore, I have to assume that the distribution changes from
concave to convex in e¤ort as we increase the signal value above the prior expected value. Since a
function is convex in two variables jointly only if it is convex in each of the variables alone, I cannot
assume global convexity or concavity, but rather impose a mean reversing convexity condition.
Proposition 3 Suppose experiments satisfy (1), (2) ; and (18) : Then, F (; e) satises
Fee (; e) = Fee

~; e

= Fee
 
; e

= 0;
Fee (; e)  0 for  2

; ~

; and
Fee (; e)  0 for  2

~; 

and thus condition (13) :
Example 1 satises (18) if all the parameters su¢ ciently small: For all  2  ;  ; I have
Hss ( js; e ) ;Hee ( js; e ) < (>) 0 for s 2 (s; ~s) (for s 2 (~s; s)). Since H ( js; e ) is twice continu-
ously di¤erentiable H ( js; e ) is concave (convex) if and only its Hessian is negative semidenite
(positive semidenite), which amounts to Hss ( js; e )Hee ( js; e )   (Hes ( js; e ))2  0 for all
s =2 fs; ~s; sg : One can verify that this is the case.16
In addition to these conditions that ensure the regularity properties of my problem with respect
to the agents choice of e¤ort17 , it will also be convenient to have conditions that guarantee that the
16Results are available from the author upon request.
17One can nd similar conditions on the conditional expectation function to guarantee the condition fe (; e) >
  1
  : However, whenever I make use of the agents rst-order condition with respect to e below, the quantity
18
monotonicity constraint in problem (11) is non binding at the optimum. Without such regularity
conditions, one may encounter problems of bunching that are well known and do not add much to
the present discussion.
Proposition 4 The distribution of  satises @@
F (;e)
f(;e)  0 if and only if
sss (s; e)
s (s; e)
  18s: (19)
In terms of the conditional distribution, condition (19) is equivalent to the condition
d
ds
264s Z

Hs ( js; e ) d
375  0; but that is hardly more informative than condition (19) ; which says
that the distribution of  has a non-decreasing inverse hazard rate if and only if the conditional
expectation function is not too concave in the sense of a standard curvature measure. In terms of
the distribution in Example 1, condition (19) is met if k is su¢ ciently small.
In the remainder of this paper I apply the rst-order approach to study the specic problem of
procurement. The rst step is to sign the multiplier : The second is to characterize the structure
of optimal contracts.
5 The Value of Information
In this section I establish two results. First, I show that it is optimal to implement a strictly positive
amount of information acquisition, that is, that the optimal level of e¤ort is strictly positive. I
conclude from this result that the value of information to the principal is positive. Second, I show
that the level of e¤ort can be either too small or too large relative to the amount of e¤ort that
maximizes the expected surplus. In particular I will show that whether there is too much or too
little information acquisition depends on the principals quasi-attitudes towards risk, that is, on
the shape of his indirect utility function.
Consider rst the value of information to the principal, which I dene as the di¤erence in
expected utility when he implements a positive amount of e¤ort and zero e¤ort. Implementing
e = 0 requires that information has no value to the agent, neither for his decision what type to
report conditional on participating, nor on his decision whether or not to participate. Building
on Proposition 1 and the discussion that follows that Proposition, the rst part of this statement
implies that the interim expected utility function,
Z 

q () d ; cannot be strictly convex in ; but
schedule q () will be strictly monotonic. Given the remaining regularity conditions, this implies that q () is
continuously di¤erentiable, which renders the boundedness assumption on fe (; e) redundant.
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must be linear. This means that production must be independent of the agents announced type,
so q () = q for all . The participation constraint of the least e¢ cient type, ; is satised with
equality (and by implication all types are willing to participate) if the principal pays the transfer
t = q +
 
    q = q to all types. This is very expensive from the principals perspective. To
show this is suboptimal, I have to show that there exist contracts that give the principal a higher
utility. It is hard to show this directly, because the level of the principals utility depends on the
shadow cost of implementing e¤ort at the optimal level of e¤ort: Therefore I establish my result
in an indirect way, showing that there exist (possibly suboptimal) contracts that implement a
positive level of e¤ort at a zero shadow cost and that give the principal a higher utility than any
contract that implements e = 0: Since the principal will be able to do even better if he is allowed
to implement any level of e¤ort, this argument shows that implementing e = 0 cant be optimal,
or in other words, that information has a strictly positive value to the principal.
To make this argument I denote q (; e) an optimal quantity schedule contingent on the e¤ort
level e: Suppose the principal o¤ers a contract that implements a level of e¤ort e at zero shadow
cost; that is the value of the multiplier ; associated to the problem of implementing e¤ort e is
zero. Then, we know from Baron and Myerson (1982) that the optimal quantity schedule satises
the condition
Vq
 
qBM (; e)

=  +
F (; e)
f (; e)
: (20)
To see this, maximize (11) point-wise with respect to q for  = 0: Conversely, consistency with
 = 0 requires that the agent be willing to choose the e¤ort level e that the quantity schedule
qBM (; e) is conditioned on. Let e^ denote the level of e¤ort that the agent nds optimal to exert
when he is o¤ered a contract with associated quantity schedule qBM (; e) : e^ satises the rst-order
condition Z 

Fe (; e^) q
BM (; e) d   ge (e^) = 0: (21)
The solution of (21) ; when viewed as a function of e; denes a best reply for the agent, e^ =
r
 
qBM (; e)

: Contract o¤er and e¤ort choice are in simultaneous equilibrium if
e = r
 
qBM (; e)

: (22)
Let e denote the (possibly empty) set of solutions to (22) : If e is non-empty, then the principal
can implement any e¤ort level in e by o¤ering the associated Baron-Myerson quantity schedule
dened by (20). O¤ering such a contract, the principal extracts some rent, and therefore he does
better than under the contract where the agent is always paid as if he had costs equal to .
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Proposition 5 It is optimal to implement a positive level of e¤ort. Formally, the set e; dened
by (20) ; (21), and (22) ; is non-empty.
To ease notation again in what follows I will drop the dependence of the optimal quantity
schedule on e where this can be done without creating confusion. Consider a locally optimal choice
of e¤ort to implement, and denote such a locally optimal value of e by e; and the associated
multiplier by : Such a choice satises the rst-order conditionZ 

((V (q ())  q ()) fe (; e)  Fe (; e) q ()) d + 
 Z 

Fee (; e
) q () d   gee (e)
!
= 0;
where I have used the envelope theorem to conclude that all indirect e¤ects through e and  on
q (; e) are zero around an optimum. Rearranging the rst-order condition, and substituting from
the rst-order condition with respect to the agents e¤ort choice, I can write
 =
R 

(V (q ())  q () fe (; e)) d   ge (e)
 
R 

Fee (; e) q () d   gee (e)
 :
The term inside the brackets of the denominator is the second-order condition of the agents e¤ort
choice. Hence, the sign of  is equal to the sign of the numerator. If the increase in the social
surplus due to an increase in e exceeds the marginal cost of acquiring information, then  is
positive; if the two terms are just equal then  is zero; otherwise the multiplier is negative at the
optimum. I will now argue that  can be of either sign at a stationary point of the principals
problem, and will give su¢ cient conditions for each case to occur.
I use the following chain of reasoning. Let ~e denote an element of e; dened by (22) ; and
let ~e denote the smallest element in e and let ~e denote the largest element in e: By denition
 (~e) = 
 
~e

= 0: Since an increase in  makes contracts more risky and the agent is a quasi-risk
lover - because incentive compatible indirect utility proles are convex - we must have  < 0 for any
e < ~e and  > 0 for any e > ~e. To establish my result, it su¢ ces to give su¢ cient conditions that
render the principals utility i) locally decreasing around e = ~e and ii) locally increasing around
e = ~e: By implication the principals utility will be locally decreasing around ~e in the former case
and will be locally increasing around ~e in the latter case, which implies the desired result.
An increase in the agents e¤ort increases the likelihood of more extreme cost perceptions.
The principal benets ex post if the agents signal is better than expected but is harmed if the
agent perceives his cost as being higher. Whether the principal likes to consume such a lottery
depends on the shape of his indirect utility function. In turn the shape of the indirect utility
function depends on the curvature of the direct utility function and on properties of the family of
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distributions fF (; e)ge0 : Dene
 (q) =
 V 00 (q)
V 0 (q)
:
 (q) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion with respect to production shocks in
the function V (q) : I will make my point by means of the example, where the posterior density is
given by h (j s; e) = 1+y(s;e)2 for  2 [ 1; 1] and zero otherwise and y (s; e) is equal to s  12
plus k times a function of s and e: In the limit as k tends to zero, the conditional expectation
function tends to  (s; e) = B + s 
1
2
3 ; a linear function of s: Hence, in the limit as k tends to zero,
the distribution of  tends to a uniform distribution on

B   16 ; B + 16

:
Proposition 6 Consider the posterior as in Example 1 as a function of k: In the limit as k tends
to zero, q (q) < (>) 0 for all q implies that there exists a stationary point to the principals problem
of choosing e where  > (<) 0:
If V (q) features decreasing absolute risk aversion and the distribution of  tends to the uniform,
then the principal benets from a marginal increase in e¤ort. These conditions render the Prin-
cipals indirect utility function convex in ; so he behaves as a quasi-risk-lover. If V (q) features
increasing absolute risk aversion, then the converse result obtains in the limit as the distribution
of  tends to the uniform.
These arguments show the existence of local maximizers with the property that  is positive or
negative, respectively; of course, these results doe not say anything about the optimal level of e¤ort
to implement, but as I have explained above (see footnote 11), this was not to be expected. Since
both constellations with  positive and  negative are possible, I will now proceed to characterize
optimal contracts for both constellations where the shadow cost of e¤ort is positive or negative.
6 The Structure of Contracts
Let fq () ; t ()g 8 denote a menu of contracts that optimally implements a given amount of
e¤ort in a truth-telling equilibrium. I shall characterize such contracts, taking their existence for
granted.18 The main obstacle to this analysis is that the value of the multiplier  is unknown. A
global treatment necessitates the use of dynamic optimization and delivers little additional insights.
Therefore it is useful to characterize the solution for e¤ort levels that are easy to implement in the
18Conditions for existence of solutions for exogenous type distributions can be found in Guesnerie and La¤ont
(1984). With a suitable adjustment for the endogeneity of information their results could be carried over.
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following sense. Dene, for any e; the statistics  (e) 
q
V ar( +F (;e)f(;e) j~)q
V ar( Fe(;e)f(;e) j~)
+
E[ +F (;e)f(;e) j~]
E[ Fe(;e)f(;e) j~] and
 (e) 
q
V ar( +F (;e)f(;e) j~)q
V ar( Fe(;e)f(;e) j~)
: Heuristically, the smaller is  (e) ; the easier is the inference about
the unobserved e¤ort from observing  relative the variation of the agents virtual surplus when
values of  below the mean are observed.  (e) is a similar ratio when only the subinterval of 
above the mean is considered.
Lemma 1 Suppose that for a given e
@
@

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)
   (e) Fe (; e)
f (; e)

 0 and @
@

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)
+  (e)
Fe (; e)
f (; e)

 0 forall :
(23)
Then, the multiplier satises   (e)   (e)   (e) :
jj measures the utility loss due to the need to give extra (less) incentives for information
gathering when marginal costs of information gathering, evaluated at a given e¤ort level, increase
by a small amount. One way to place a bound on this loss is to nd a simple contract that continues
to implement a given level of e¤ort when marginal cost of e¤ort increase (decrease) by a small
amount. One di¢ culty is again to avoid the need to invoke control theory to make this point. The
monotonicity conditions in the statement of the lemma are imposed to this end. Then, starting from
a strictly monotonic contract, the principal can shock the amount of production by adding "Fe(;e)f(;e)
to the original quantity schedule for  below ~. Since Fe (; e) is non-negative for these values of
; the agent has higher incentives to acquire information. The " that is needed to compensate
for a given increase in marginal costs of e¤ort is inversely proportional to E

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
2   ~ :
On the other hand, the expected cost in terms of higher payments to the agent is proportional to
E
h
 + F (;e)f(;e)

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~i :  (e) is an upper bound on the ratio of these two expectations.
 (e) is derived from an analogous procedure when the principal shocks production by an amount
"Fe(;e)f(;e) for   ~ and " < 0, which reduces the agents incentive to acquire information.
The posterior in Example 1 meets the conditions in Lemma 1 if both k and e are su¢ ciently
small. If e is small, then the expectation and the variance of  + F (;e)f(;e) are largely exogenous,
whereas the expectation and the variance of Fe(;e)f(;e) = 
 1
e (; e)s
 
 1 (; e) ; e

become larger as
e becomes smaller. The smaller is e, the larger is the marginal e¤ect of an increase in e on the
conditional expectation for given s, so je (s; e)j is higher for all s =2

0; 12 ; 1
	
. Hence
 1e (; e) is
higher for all  =2
n
; ~; 
o
: Hence, the given variation in s induces a larger variation in Fe(;e)f(;e) the
smaller is e: As a result  (e) and  (e) tend to be small. Changing variables from  to s; condition
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(23) can be written as 2 + sss(s;e)s(s;e) +  (e)
es(s;e)
s(s;e)
 0 and 2 + sss(s;e)s(s;e)    (e)
es(s;e)
s(s;e)
 0; which
is met for k small.
I abstain from a discussion of the case where these conditions are violated, because the advan-
tage of bounding the absolute value of the multiplier is that one can characterize the solution to
the contracting problem without recourse to control techniques:
Proposition 7 Suppose that F (; e) satises condition (23) for a given level of e: Then the optimal
quantity schedule that implements e is characterized by
Vq (q
 ()) =  +
F (; e)
f (; e)
  Fe (; e)
f (; e)
: (24)
The formal proof of this proposition is omitted, since it follows straightforwardly from the
previous results. The production schedule coincides with the Baron Myerson schedule at the top,
at the prior mean, and at the bottom. Otherwise, there is an additional distortion. The direction
of the extra distortion depends on whether the principal wants to give the agent more or less of
an incentive to acquire information relative to the Baron Myerson contract. In the former case
production is increased for surprisingly low cost perceptions and decreased for surprisingly bad
cost assessments. The sensitivity of the production scheme with respect to the agents information
is increased to provide extra incentives for information acquisition. In the latter case, the reverse
happens and production is more equalized in order to dampen the agents interest in additional
information. The size of the additional distortion depends on how informative a given message is
about the agents unobserved e¤ort choice.19
In the remainder of this article I study how these results are a¤ected by changes in the under-
lying structure of experiments.
7 Alternative Experiment Structures
7.1 Moving Supports and Distortions at the top
Sofar, I have characterized solutions to the contracting problem when the support of the agents
conditional expectation is xed. This is analytically very convenient, but moving supports may
19The term Fe(;e)
f(;e)
has an interpretation in terms of hypothesis testing. Write Fe(;e)
F (;e)
=
f(;e)
F (;e)
:
Fe(;e)
F (;e)
is the
derivative of the log-likelihood if the statistician observes only if the values in a sample are smaller than  and wants
to compute the optimal value of e: This statistic is important in the contract because the production at  changes
the rent of all types who are at least as e¢ cient as : Division by f(;e)
F (;e)
normalizes by the conditional density.
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easily arise. To see this, modify example 120 to the case where y (e; s) = e
 
s  12

; so that the
posterior density becomes h (j s; e) = 1+e(s 
1
2 )
2 for  2 [ 1; 1] and zero otherwise: For an
upper bound of e equal to e = 2 I have h (j s; e)  0 for all ; s and all e  e: Again this
posterior satises (16) and (17) :21 One veries that  (s; e) = B +
e(s  12 )
3 : The bounds of the
support are  (s; e) = B   e6 and  (s; e) = B + e6 : Observe that the support of  is a subset of the
support of  and the upper bound is increasing in e and the lower bound is decreasing in e: For
all values of e; the distribution of  is uniform. Thus it is natural to wonder how the analysis is
a¤ected by the possibility of moving supports.
I will show in this section that there are some problems with the rst-order approach; it is not
possible to justify such an approach in general. However, whenever such an approach is valid, then
the main qualitative features of contracts remain unchanged. One notable exception is that there
is now a distortion at the top.
There are some essential di¤erences in the agents problem. I will stick to the following notation
in this section. I let  (e) and  (e) denote the upper and the lower bound of the support of the
conditional mean, respectively. I assume that the upper bound is increasing in e and that the lower
bound is decreasing in e: In addition, I let  and  denote the bounds of the support associated to
the e¤ort level that the principal wishes to implement. Notice that these are independent of the
agents actual actions. Obviously the principals contract o¤er satises the participation constraint
of type  with equality. Suppose the agent chooses an e¤ort level that is higher than the one the
principal wishes to implement. If the agent receives a high signal, then his participation constraint
is violated for all  2  ;  (e) : So, the agent refuses to participate and obtains zero rent in this
case22 . Suppose after choosing an e¤ort level that is too high, the agent receives a very low signal.
In that case, for  2 [ (e) ; ] the agent will be treated the same way as an agent with expected
marginal costs equal to 23 : Suppose on the other hand, that the agent chooses an e¤ort level which
is too low. In that case we have  (e) < ; which implies that type  (e) receives a strictly positive
rent equal to
Z
(e)
q () d : It follows from these considerations that I can always write the agents
20This specication of the example is adapted from Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001).
21The example does not satisfy (18) ; but this is inessential for the point I am making here. As an example
that sastises all three conditions, take h (j s; e) = 1+y(s;e)
2
for  2 [ 1; 1] and zero otherwise, where
y (s; e) = s  1
2
+ k

s
 
s  1
2

(1  s) + le  s  1
2
3
:
22Of course, contracts that are declined can be represented by null-contracts which are always acceptable to the
agent. I discuss the relationship between these two notions of contracts in the proof of Result 1 in the appendix.
23See the proof of Result 1 in the appendix for details.
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indirect utility, u () ; for any given e¤ort choice and any e¤ort (and support) that the principal
wishes to implement as
u () = max
8><>:0;
Z

q () d
9>=>; : (25)
Finally, consider the probability distribution. It has the properties that F ( (e) ; e) = 0 and
F
 
 (e) ; e

= 1. Moreover, it satises
dF (; e)
d
=
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for  <  (e)
f (; e) > 0 for  2  (e) ;  (e)
0  >  (e) :
(26)
I can now derive the agents ex ante expected utility from (25) and (26) : This is somewhat tedious
but straightforward, so I relegate the derivation of the following result to the appendix.
Result 1 With moving supports the agents ex ante expected indirect utility satises
E [u ()] = q ()
Z
(e)
F (; e) d +
Z

q ()F (; e) d:
Notice that the equilibrium expected utility boils down to E [u ()] =
Z

q ()F (; e) d: But there
is a crucial di¤erence at the ex ante stage when the agent chooses the level of e¤ort. An incentive
compatible choice of e¤ort must satisfy the condition
e = argmax
e^
8><>:q ()
Z
(e)
F (; e^) d +
Z

q ()F (; e^) d   g (e^)
9>=>; : (27)
Even if at the optimum one obviously has  (e) = ; (27) cannot simply be replaced by the rst-
order condition
Z

q ()Fe (; e) d   ge (e) = 0
for any arbitrary, incentive compatible quantity schedule q () : Even if I impose the same conditions
as before, namely that the law of iterated expectations holds, and that an increase in e¤ort induces
a mean reversing rst order stochastic dominance shift, and that the distribution satises the mean
reversing concavity/convexity conditions, it is no longer true that the agent always prefers to have
more information (at the same cost). To see this, assume for simplicity that q () is continuously
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di¤erentiable for  2 ; 24 , and integrate by parts to obtain
Z

q ()Fe (; e) d = q
 


Fe
 
; e
  q ()Fe (; e)  Z

q ()
Z

Fe ( ; e) dd:
Under my assumptions q
 


Fe
 
; e
  q ()Fe (; e)  0; and this inequality is strict for the case
where  <  (e) and  >  (e) : Hence, one can nd monotonic quantity schedules where the agent
does not value additional information. It is also no longer true that the agents expected indirect
utility (gross of e¤ort costs) is concave in e¤ort, since
Z

q ()Fee (; e) d = q
 


Fee
 
; e
  q ()Fee (; e)  Z

q ()
Z

Fee ( ; e) dd
and q
 


Fee
 
; e
 q ()Fee (; e)  0 with a strict inequality when  <  (e) and  >  (e) : Hence,
the same caveat applies here. However, whenever the rst-order condition adequately describes
the solution to the agents problem, I have the following result.
Proposition 8 If the rst-order approach is valid, and condition (23) holds, then an optimal
quantity schedule satises the condition
Vq (q
 ()) =  +
F (; e)
f (; e)
  Fe (; e)
f (; e)
:
For the case where  > 0 ( < 0) the level of production at the top is higher (smaller) than the
Baron Myerson quantity at  = ; the level of production at  =  is lower (higher) than the Baron
Myerson quantity.
The rationale for this result is simple. With moving supports, an increase of the agents
e¤ort does have an impact on the mass at the bounds of the support that the principal wishes to
implement; at the lower bound the agents e¤ort increases the value of the distribution function at
the margin, at the upper bound of the support his e¤ort decreases the mass at the margin. Hence,
there are additional distortions to consider relative to the case with a xed distribution of types.
7.2 Stochastic Experiments
I end this article with a discussion of a class of updating processes that gives rise to a particularly
tractable model. Suppose e¤ort does not inuence the posterior distribution directly, but rather
24As I have demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1, the argument can be generalized to the case where q ()
is only piecewise di¤erentiable.
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inuences only the likelihood of obtaining di¤erent posteriors that are independent of e¤ort. I
show in this section that the rst-order approach is rather easy to justify in that case. In addition,
all the qualitative insights developed for the more general model are still valid.
Suppose an experiment is the realization of two random variables, S and I; and a resulting
posterior with cdf H (j s; i) : The variable S is still the signal, I is an informativeness parameter.
Typical realizations of these variables are s 2 [s; s] = [0; 1] and i 2 [0; 1] ; respectively. The
marginal distributions of s and i are independent of each other and fully supported with densities
k (s) = 1 for s 2 [0; 1] (and zero otherwise) and l (i; e) ; respectively. Let L (i; e) denote the cdf
of the random variable i. Assume that l (i; e) > 0 for all i and all e: Denote the conditional
expectation function as  (s; i) =
R 

dH ( js; i ). The interpretation of the random variable  is
unchanged. Provided that  (s; i) is strictly increasing in s for all i, the function is invertible and
we can write s =  1 (; i) for the value of s that generates the conditional expected value : The
cdf of  conditional on i is
F i (; i) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for  <  (s; i)
 1 (; i) for  (s; i)     (s; i)
1  >  (s; i)
Let F (; e) denote the unconditional cdf of : I have
F (; e) =
Z 1
0
F i (; i) dL (i; e) (28)
By construction,  is independent of e¤ort and its distribution is fully supported on an interval
; 

; independent of e¤ort where  = mini  (s; i) and  = maxi  (s; i) :
To order experiments, I assume that the posterior density satises the mean reversing monotone
likelihood ratio property, formally, I assume that
@
@

hi ( js; i )
h ( js; i )

< 0 for s 2 (s; ~s) and @
@

hi ( js; i )
h ( js; i )

> 0 for s 2 (~s; s) (29)
and
@
@

hi ( js; i )
h ( js; i )

= 0 for s 2 fs; ~s; sg : (30)
As I have explained in section 4, (29) implies that higher values of i correspond to more informative
experiments. In particular, this implies again that conditional on a signal above (below) the mean,
the posterior distribution conditional on a given informativeness i is the higher (lower) in the sense
of FOSD the higher is i: In addition let
Le (i; e)  0 and Lee (i; e)  0: (31)
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Then, an increase in e¤ort makes it more likely to perform a more informative experiment; and
the marginal impact of e¤ort on the distribution of experiments is decreasing in e: Within this
structure, I have the following result:
Proposition 9 Given conditions (29) ; (30) ; and (31) ; the distribution F (; e) satises conditions
(8) ; (9) ; (12) ; and (13) ; and hence the rst-order approach is valid. Under the monotonicity
condition (23), the optimal quantity schedule satises the condition
Vq (q
 ()) =  +
F (; e)
f (; e)
  Fe (; e)
f (; e)
:
Thus, it is easy to justify a rst-order approach if we think of the agents e¤ort as of span-
ningthe possible posteriors. Moreover, this model is appealing because it comprises much of the
existing literature and therefore generalizes the ndings of this literature. All-or-nothing informa-
tion acquisition corresponds to the case where there are just two distributions of the conditional
expectation conditional on i, F 0 (; 0) and F 1 (; 1) ; the distribution F 0 (; 0) has mass one at
E = E and the distribution F 1 (; 1) corresponds to the distribution P () : In the current
setup I assume that the distribution F 0 (; 0) has no atoms, but of course it can be close to a
mass-point at E: This assumption eliminates the discontinuities found in the earlier literature.
Moreover, I allow for a continuum of levels of informativeness, i; that are (heuristically) ordered
the way that the distributions F i (; i) are the closer to P () the higher is i25 : Since this model is
particularly easy to handle, it should prove useful in further applications.
8 Conclusion
The main result of the paper is that information and risk are equivalent in a wide class of reporting
games with endogenous information. It is justied to describe the amount of information acquisition
by the solution of a rst-order condition for any incentive compatible contract, if the agents
information gathering increases risk in the ex ante distribution of the conditional expectation in
the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Su¢ cient conditions on experiment structures are
provided that generate such an ordering. The robust results that follow from the approach are
that contracts that provide the agent with extra incentives for information acquisition are more
sensitive to the agents information relative to their xed information counterparts. The reverse is
true when incentives for information acquisition are reduced. Results beyond these depend on the
specic information structure and are therefore not robust.
25 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation.
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The paper has derived a tractable modeling of information acquisition and a reduced form
which is relatively easy to handle. It can be used to address any problem of mechanism design in
the single agent case and extends easily to multi-agent mechanism design problems in the linear,
private values environment.
9 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. Truth-telling: For convenience I summarize the known features of the
contract. For a more extensive treatment, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or La¤ont and Tirole
(1993). Consider rst monotonicity of q () : From incentive compatibility of reports, we know that
type  must not have any incentive to mimic type ^; and vice-versa; formally
t ()  q ()  t

^

  q

^

; and
t

^

  ^q

^

 t ()  ^q () :
Adding these inequalities, I obtain
   ^

q

^

  q ()

 0:
Hence, the pair of schedules (t () ; q ()) is incentive compatible only if q () is non-increasing in
: Moreover, since q () is non-increasing in ; it is di¤erentiable almost everywhere. Hence, q ()
satises almost everywhere q ()  0: Let u

; ^

= t

^

  q

^

and
u ()  max
^
n
t

^

  q

^
o
: (32)
By the envelope theorem, u () =  q () a.e.: Moreover, the least e¢ cient type ; is indi¤erent
between participating and not, u
 


= 0: Hence u () =   R 

u () d =
R 

q()d : Since q ()
is non-increasing u () is convex. Finally, monotonicity makes the local rst-order condition with
respect to ^ su¢ cient for a global optimum in truth-telling. Substituting t() = q() +
R 

q()d
into the objective one hasZ 

 
V (q ()) 
 
q () +
Z 

q()d
!!
f (; e) d: (33)
Integration by parts delivers the representation in terms of expected surplus net of the agents
expected virtual surplus (Myerson (1981)),
R 


V (q ()) 

 + F (;e)f(;e)

q ()

f (; e) d:
The e¤ort constraint: The e¤ort constraint can be written as
e 2 argmax
e
(Z 

u () f (; e) d   g (e)
)
;
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where u () =
R 

q()d is the convex function dened in (32) : Consider the integral
R 

u () f (; e) d:
By conditions (8) and (12) ; an increase in e induces a mean preserving spread in the distribution
of : Since u () is convex, the equivalence results of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) imply thatR 

u () f (; e00) d  R 

u () f (; e0) d for any e00 > e0; so
R 

u () f (; e) d is non-decreasing in
e: Consider now the derivative of
R 

u () f (; e) d with respect to e;
R 

 
u () fe (; e) d: Obviously,
I can write Z 

u () fe (; e) d =  
Z 

u ()
1
   d +
Z 

u ()

fe (; e) +
1
   

d:
Notice that fe (; e)+ 1  is a density. To see this, observe that fe (; e)+
1
   08 by assumption
and Z 


fe (; e) +
1
   

d = 1;
because f (; e) being a density for all e requires that
R 

fe (; e) d = 0; and
R 

1
 d = 1;
1
 
is the density of the uniform distribution on

; 

: Then, we can apply again the Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970) equivalence result, but this time to the density f^ (; e)  fe (; e) + 1  : Let
F^ (; e)  R 

f^ ( ; e) d denote the cdf of the new distribution. We have;
F^ (; e) = Fe (; e) +
   
   
and hence Z 

F^e ( ; e) d =
Z 

Fee ( ; e) d :
It follows from conditions (9) and (13) that a reduction in e induces a mean preserving spread in
the distribution of  under F^ (; e) : So, by the equivalence result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)
a decision-maker with a convex utility function dislikes an increase in e; which implies that for any
e00 > e0 Z 

u () f^e (; e
00) d 
Z 

u () f^ (; e0) d:
Adding   R 

u () 1 d on both sides and eliminating the redundant terms, I have shown thatR 

u () fe (; e) d is non-increasing in e: Hence,
R 

u () f (; e) d is non-decreasing and concave
in e; which implies that the rst-order condition,Z 

u () fe (; e) d   ge (e) = 0;
is necessary and su¢ cient for an optimal level of e: Substituting for u () =
R 

q()d ; integrating
by parts, and using the assumption of non-moving supports, I can writeZ 

Z 

q()dfe (; e) d =
Z 

q()Fe (; e) d:
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Hence, the agents optimal choice of e¤ort is the solution to the rst-order conditionZ 

q()Fe (; e) d   ge (e) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 2. Di¤erentiating (7) with respect to e; I have
Fe (; e) = 
 1
e (; e) :
The proof is given in two parts. In the rst part I establish the properties of the conditional
expectation function that follow from the assumptions; in the second part I use these characteristics
to establish the properties of the distribution of the conditional expectation.
Part I: After an integration by parts, I can write the conditional expectation as
 (s; e) =   
Z

H (j s; e) d:
Di¤erentiating with respect to s; I have
s (s; e) =  
Z

Hs (j s; e) d;
due to assumption (1) ; I have s (s; e) > 0 for all s:
Di¤erentiating with respect to e I have
e (s; e) =  
Z

He (j s; e) d;
due to assumption (16), I have e (s; e) < 0 for s 2 (s; ~s) ; e (s; e) > 0 for s 2 (~s; s), and
e (s; e) = 0 for s 2 fs; ~s; sg :
Part II: Di¤erentiating the conditional expectation function totally, I obtain
d = s (s; e) ds+ e (s; e) de:
For a constant ; I have
ds
de
=  e (s; e)
s (s; e)
;
where s =  1 (; e) : Note that the inverse is well dened due to the property that s (s; e) > 0:
Substituting for s and ds; I have
 1e (; e) =
d 1 (; e)
de
=  e
 
 1 (; e) ; e

s ( 1 (; e) ; e)
: (34)
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Since  2
n
; ~; 
o
i¤ s 2 fs; ~s; sg ;  2

; ~

i¤ s 2 (s; ~s) ; and  2

~; 

i¤ s 2 (~s; s) ; it follows
that
Fe (; e) = 0 for  2
n
; ~; 
o
and Fe (; e) ? 0 for  7 ~:
Proof of Proposition 3. Di¤erentiating (7) another time with respect to e; I have
Fee (; e) = 
 1
ee (; e) :
Di¤erentiating (34) once more with respect to e; I obtain
 1ee (; e) =  
ee (; e)s (; e) + es
 
 1 (; e) ; e

ds
des (; e) 
 
ss (; e) dsde + se (; e)

e (; e)
(s (; e))2
=
 1
s (; e)
 
ee (; e) + 2es (; e)
s (; e)
ds
de
+
ss (; e)
s (; e)

ds
de
2!
;
where I have used (34) ; to obtain the second equality. Dene
(; e)  ee (; e) + 2es (; e)
s (; e)
ds
de
+
ss (; e)
s (; e)

ds
de
2
The conditions in the proposition are satised i¤
 1ee (; e) Q 0 for  Q ~:
Since  1s(;e) < 0; this is equivalent to
(; e)  ee (; e) + 2es (; e)
s (; e)
ds
de
+
ss (; e)
s (; e)

ds
de
2
 () 0 for   () ~: (35)
I now prove that condition (18) implies that the function  (s; e) satises condition (35) : To show
this, I will treat dsde as a free variable despite the fact that
ds
de =  
e( 1(;e);e)
s( 1(;e);e)
is determined by
the function : Letting 
 
ds
de ; ; e

denote the function (; e) when dsde is a free variable, I choose
ds
de to minimize 
 
ds
de ; ; e

for   ~ and choose dsde to maximize 
 
ds
de ; ; e

for   ~: Since the
procedures are identical in both cases, I treat only the rst case.
For the case   ~; let dsde

denote a minimizer of 
 
ds
de ; ; e

: By denition, (; e) 


ds
de

; ; e

: Hence, if 

ds
de

; ; e

 0 for all   ~; then (; e)  0 for all   ~ and the
proof is complete.
First, I show that 
 
ds
de ; ; e

is convex in dsde for   ~: To see this, note that since H ( js; e ) is
concave in (s; e) for s 2 (s; ~s) ;  H ( js; e ) is convex in (s; e) for s 2 (s; ~s) : Moreover, convexity is
preserved under summation and integration. Hence,  (s; e) =  
Z

H (j s; e) d is convex in (s; e)
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for s 2 (s; ~s) : Hence, I have ss (s; e) > 0, ee (s; e) > 0; and ss (s; e)ee (s; e)  (se (s; e))2  0
for all e and s 2 (s; ~s) : Di¤erentiating   dsde ; ; e twice with respect to dsde I get
@2
 
ds
de ; ; e

@
 
ds
de
2 = 2ss (; e)s (; e) > 0 for  2

; ~

:
Hence, 
 
ds
de ; ; e

has a unique minimizer, which satises the rst-order condition
ds
de

=  es (; e)
ss (; e) ;
and the minimum satises


ds
de

; ; e

= ee (; e)  (es (; e))
2
s (; e)ss (; e) :
Convexity of  (s; e) implies that 

ds
de

; ; e

 0: Since (; e)  

ds
de

; ; e

by denition, I
have shown that (; e)  0:
The proof for s 2 (~s; s) is analogous and therefore omitted. It follows that Fee (; e) =
 1ee (; e) Q 0 for  Q ~:
Proof of Proposition 4. Using (7) and (10) ; the inverse hazard rate is
F (; e)
f (; e)
=  1 (; e)s
 
 1 (; e) ; e

:
Di¤erentiating with respect to  I obtain
@
@
F (; e)
f (; e)
=
s
 
 1 (; e) ; e

s ( 1 (; e) ; e)
+  1 (; e)
ss
 
 1 (; e) ; e

s ( 1 (; e) ; e)
= 1 +  1 (; e)
ss
 
 1 (; e) ; e

s ( 1 (; e) ; e)
:
Thus,
@
@
F (; e)
f (; e)
 0, 1 + sss (s; e)
s (s; e)
 0:
Proof of Proposition 5. e = 0 is optimal for the agent if and only if q() = q for all  and
t  q  0 for all : The best such contract from the principals perspective solves
max
q;t
Z 

(V (q)  t) dF (; e)
s:t: t  q  0:
The optimal contract in this class satises
Vq (q)jq=q^ = 
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and t^ = q^: This contract is very costly to the principal, because he pays the agent always as if
this one had the highest possible cost. Suppose instead the principal o¤ers the contract
qBM (; e) = V  1q

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

: (36)
This contract corresponds to the case where the principal neglects his inuence on the agents
e¤ort choice but o¤ers a contract which elicits information truthfully. Notice that due to condi-
tion (19) in Proposition 4 qBM (; e) is strictly monotonic in : Since the principal extracts some
rents o¤ering quantity schedule qBM (; e) with the associated transfer schedule to the agent, this
contract dominates the contract

t^; q^
	
:
I now prove that there exist e¤ort levels such that the principals contract o¤er is a best reply
to the agents choice of e¤ort and the agents choice of e¤ort is consistent with the contract o¤ered;
that is, in addition to (36) ; it must also be true thatZ 

Fe (; e^) q
BM (; e) d   ge (e^)

e^=e
= 0: (37)
Consider the agents utility as a function of e^ and e :Z 

F (; e^) qBM (; e) d   g (e^) :
Under our assumptions, qBM (; e) is di¤erentiable in e: Hence, the agents utility is continuous in
e and e^ and strictly concave in e^: By the theorem of the maximum, the maximizer correspondence
of the agents utility function with respect to e^ is upper hemicontinuous. By strict concavity in
e^; the maximizer correspondence is in fact a function. Since a single valued correspondence is
upper hemicontinuous if and only if it is continuous as a function, it follows that the maximizer of
the agents utility function is a continuous function of the principals conjectured e¤ort level. Let
e^ = r
 
qBM (; e)

denote the agents optimal choice of e¤ort when the principal o¤ers contract
qBM (; e) : Dene
  (e) 
Z

Fe
 
; r
 
qBM (; e)

V  1q

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

d   ge
 
r
 
qBM (; e)

: (38)
An equilibrium e¤ort (that satises both (36) and (37)) is then dened as a solution to the equation
  (e) = 0; or, equivalently, as xed point satisfying e = r
 
qBM (; e)

:
Such a xed point must exist, because I have r
 
qBM (; e)

e=0
> 0 and r
 
qBM (; e)

e=e
< e:
To see the rst point, notice that the family of distributions has a monotone hazard rate for all e:
Therefore, qBM (; 0) is a strictly monotonic contract, and the agent has a strictly positive incentive
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to acquire information. To see the second point, notice that the marginal cost of e¤ort goes to
innity as e approaches e: Since r
 
qBM (; e)

is a continuous function, it must have a xed point
by Brouwers xed point theorem.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is split into two parts. In the rst part, I show that
the multiplier  is negative for e < ~e and that  is positive for e > ~e: In the second part, I give
su¢ cient conditions for a small increase in the e¤ort level to be benecial to the principal around
 = 0:
Part i) If e < ~e then  < 0; if e > ~e then  > 0:
By the denition of the smallest xed point, we know that r
 
qBM (; e)

> e for e < ~e: To make
sure that the agent indeed chooses e; the principal must reduce the agents incentive to acquire
information. This is achieved by reducing production for   ~ and increasing production for
  ~: From the condition of optimality,
Vq (q ()) =  +
F (; e)
f (; e)
  Fe (; e)
f (; e)
we conclude that  < 0 since Fe (; e)  0 for   ~ and Fe (; e)  0 for  > ~: The proof for e > ~e
is analogous and therefore omitted.
Part ii) The marginal e¤ect of a small increase in e around a point where  = 0 :
Let
W (e)  max
q()
8><>:
R 


V (q ()) 

 + F (;e)f(;e)

q ()

f (; e) d
+
R 

Fe (; e) q () d   ge (e)

9>=>;
Invoking the envelope theorem I have around a point where  = 0
We (e) =
Z 

 
V (q ()) 
 
q () +
Z 

q()d
!!
fe (; e) d:
Integrating by parts, and noting that Fe (; e) = Fe
 
; e

= 0; I can write
We (e) =  
Z 

(Vq (q ())  ) q ()Fe (; e) d:
Substituting for q () =
@
@ (+
F (;e)
f(;e) )
Vqq(q())
; for F (;e)f(;e) = Vq (q ())  ; and multiplying by Vq(q())+F (;e)
f(;e)
= 1
I obtain
We (e) =  
Z 

F (;e)
f(;e)
Vqq (q ())
Vq (q ())
 + F (;e)f(;e)
@
@

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

Fe (; e) d
Recall that  (q) =  Vqq(q)Vq(q) and let  (q) 
Vq(q())
Vqq(q())
=   1(q) : Then, recollecting terms, I can write
We (e) =  
Z 

0@ (q ()) F (;e)f(;e)
 + F (;e)f(;e)
@
@

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)
1AFe (; e) d:
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After another integration by parts, using the fact that
R 

Fe ( ; e) d = 0 for  =  and for  = ;
I have
We (e) =
Z 

0@Z 

Fe ( ; e) d
@
@
24 (q ()) F (;e)f(;e)
 + F (;e)f(;e)
@
@

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)
351A d:
Notice that
R 

Fe ( ; e) d  0 by proposition 2. Thus, to prove the result, it su¢ ces to sign the
expression @@ []. Dene
X ()   (q ())
F (;e)
f(;e)
 + F (;e)f(;e)
@
@

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

:
Performing the di¤erentiation, I have
X () = q (q ()) q ()
F (;e)
f(;e)
 + F (;e)f(;e)
@
@

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

+ (q ())
 @@
F (;e)
f(;e)   F (;e)f(;e)
 + F (;e)f(;e)
2 @@

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

+ (q ())
F (;e)
f(;e)
 + F (;e)f(;e)
@2
@2

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

:
To sign, these expressions, notice that  @@
F (;e)
f(;e)   F (;e)f(;e) and @
2
@2

 + F (;e)f(;e)

both go to zero when
F (; e) converges to a uniform distribution. Hence the sign ofX () is the sign of  q (q ()) (since
q () < 0). Since sign
 
q (q)

= sign
 
q (q)

; it follows that q (q) < 0 implies We (e) > 0 and
q (q) > 0 implies that We (e) < 0:
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the cost function is changed to g^ (e) = g (e) + g (e) where 
is a parameter that takes values in the interval [ ; ], and where  < 1: Notice that the function
g^ (e) is an Inada cost function for any such , and an interior solution is guaranteed. The marginal
cost to the agent of exerting e¤ort e is now g^e (e) = ge (e) + ge (e) : The multiplier  is equal to
the change in the principals utility due to a change in ge (e) : Since e is a constant, I can dene
c ()  ge (e) : Let W (c) denote the welfare of the principal as a function of c
W (c) = max
q()
Z 


V (q ()) 

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

q ()

f (; e) d
+
 Z 

Fe (; e) q
 () d   ge (e)  c
!
and let q () denote the optimal quantity schedule for c = 0: Finally, let W (0) denote the value
of welfare for c = 0 (that is,  = 0): From the envelope theorem, I have
Wc (c) =  :
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I now provide bounds on the multiplier. I distinguish two cases, a)  > 0 and b)  < 0: Since
c () ? 0 i¤  ? 0 I directly state my results in terms of c:
Case a): If c > 0; then the principal must do at least as well as when he o¤ers a contract with
production schedule
q^ () =
8><>: q
 () + "Fe(;e)f(;e) for   ~
q () for  > ~:
From the agents rst-order conditions with respect to e, for c = 0 and for c > 0; respectively, I
have Z 

Fe (; e) q
 () d = ge (e) andZ 

Fe (; e) q^ () d = ge (e) + c:
Hence, " and c are related by the condition
" =
cR ~

Fe (; e)
Fe(;e)
f(;e) d
:
Dene
Y + 
Z ~

Fe (; e)
Fe (; e)
f (; e)
d:
Notice that
Y + = F

~; e
Z ~


Fe (; e)
f (; e)
2
f (; e)
F

~; e
d
= F

~; e
 
V ar

Fe (; e)
f (; e)
   ~+ E  Fe (; e)f (; e)
   ~2
!
;
where the second equality follows from completing the square by E
h
Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~i E h Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~i :
For the welfare of the principal, I have
W (c) 
Z


V

q () + 1~"
Fe (; e)
f (; e)

 

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

q () + 1~"
Fe (; e)
f (; e)

f (; e) d

Z


V (q ()) 

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

q () + 1~"
Fe (; e)
f (; e)

f (; e) d
= W (0)  "
~Z


 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

Fe (; e)
f (; e)
f (; e) d;
where the rst inequality follows from the denition of W (c) and the second uses the fact that
"Fe(;e)f(;e)  0 for all   ~; so that the principal must do at least as well as by simply not consuming
38
the extra quantity that is produced: Dene
Z+ 
~Z


 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

Fe (; e)
f (; e)
f (; e) d
and notice that, again by completing the square,
Z+ = F

~; e
 ~Z


 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

Fe (; e)
f (; e)
f (; e)
F

~; e
d
= F

~; e
0B@ Cov

 + F (;e)f(;e) ;
Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~
+E
h
 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~iE h Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~i
1CA :
Combining these results, I can write
W (c) W (0)   cZ
+
Y +
:
Dividing by c > 0 and taking limits as c! 0 I obtain
lim
c!0
W (c) W (0)
c
=     Z
+
Y +
;
or
  Z
+
Y +
:
Substituting for Y + and Z+; I have
Z+
Y +
=
Cov

 + F (;e)f(;e) ;
Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~+ E h Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~i2 +
E
h
 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~iE h Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~i
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~+ E h Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~i2

r
V ar

 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~rV ar  Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~+ E h Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~i2 +
E
h
 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~iE h Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~i
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~+ E h Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~i2

r
V ar

 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~rV ar  Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~ +
E
h
 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~iE h Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~i
E
h
Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~i2
=
r
V ar

 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~r
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~ +
E
h
 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~i
E
h
Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~i ;
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that for any two random variables A and B;
Cov (A;B)  pV ar (A)pV ar (B) and the second from the fact that the denominators become
smaller. Hence, I have shown that
 
r
V ar

 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~r
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~ +
E
h
 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~i
E
h
Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~i : (39)
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Case b) c < 0: In this case, the principal can do at least as well as by o¤ering the contract
q^ () =
8><>: q
 () for  < ~
q () + "Fe(;e)f(;e) for   ~:
" is again dened by the rst-order condition for e¤ort
" =   c
Y  
;
where
Y   
Z
~
Fe (; e)
Fe (; e)
f (; e)
d:
Notice that " < 0: I have
W (c) 
Z


V

q () + 1~"
Fe (; e)
f (; e)

 

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

q () + 1~"
Fe (; e)
f (; e)

f (; e) d

Z


V (q ()) 

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

q () + 1~"
Fe (; e)
f (; e)

f (; e) d
= W (0)  "
Z
~

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

Fe (; e)
f (; e)
f (; e) d;
where the rst inequality uses the denition of W (c) ; the second uses the fact that "Fe(;e)f(;e) is
non-negative for   ~; so the principals utility is at least as high as when he does not consume
the additional quantity at all. Dene
Z  
Z
~

 +
F (; e)
f (; e)

Fe (; e)
f (; e)
f (; e) d:
Substituting from the agents rst-order condition for "; and taking limits as c goes to zero, I can
write
lim
c!0
W (0) W (c)
 c =   
Z 
Y  
;
since the left-hand side is the left-side di¤erential of W with respect to c:
Performing the same operations as in part a) I nd that
Z 
Y  

r
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~rV ar  + F (;e)f(;e)    ~+ E  + F (;e)f(;e)    ~E  Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~+ E  Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~2

r
V ar

 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~r
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~ ;
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where the rst inequality is again based on the observation that for any two random variables A and
B; Cov (A;B) pV ar (A)pV ar (B); and the second inequality uses the fact that E  Fe(;e)f(;e)    ~ <
0: Hence, I have shown that
   
r
V ar

 + F (;e)f(;e)
   ~r
V ar

Fe(;e)
f(;e)
   ~ :
Proof of Result 1. Suppose the principal wishes to implement a level of e¤ort e such that
the agents equilibrium type distribution is supported on

; 

: In equilibrium, the e¤ort level e
is implemented by a pair of schedules (q () ; t ()) dened on

; 

: However, since the agent can
deviate to higher e¤ort levels, the message space needs to be extended to the set

 (e) ;  (e)

; so
that the agent can still be induced to reveal his true type, regardless of what his e¤ort choice is. To
deal with this issue, I extend the domain of denition of the schedules (q () ; t ()) to

 (e) ;  (e)

as follows. I let
q^ () 
8>>>><>>>>:
q () for   
q () for     
0 for  > :
t^ () is dened as t^ () = q^ () +
(e)Z

q^ () d: Notice that the agent participates under the menu 
q^ () ; t^ ()

for all , whereas under (q () ; t ()) the agent rejects if  > : Since under
 
q^ () ; t^ ()

the principal o¤ers the null-contract for  > ; the two formulations are equivalent in the sense that
they induce the same expected utilities. Finally, under
 
q^ () ; t^ ()

; the principal o¤ers contract
q () ; t () to all types with   : Since the principal wishes to implement a distribution of types
which is supported only on the interval

; 

; any pair of quantity and payment schedules for
 <  is optimal as long as it is incentive compatible. Since q^ () is monotonic
 
q^ () ; t^ ()

is
indeed incentive compatible.
The agents ex ante expected utility (gross of costs of information acquisition) can now be
written as
E [u ()] =
(e)Z
(e)
(e)Z

q^ () ddF (; e) :
Three cases can arise. In case i) the agent chooses the equilibrium level of e¤ort in which case
 (e) =  and  (e) = . This case corresponds to the case discussed in the main model. In case
41
ii) the agent deviates from the equilibrium e¤ort to a higher level, in which case  (e) >  and
 (e) < . In case iii) the agent deviates to a lower level of e¤ort which implies that  (e) <  and
 (e) > . I now show that in all three cases, I can write
E [u ()] =
(e)Z
(e)
max
8><>:0;
Z

q^ () d
9>=>; dF (; e) : (40)
In case i)  (e) =  and  (e) =  and dF (; e) = 0 for  2 [ (e) ; ) or  2  ;  (e) : Moreover,
q^ ()  q () for  2 ;  : Hence, E [u ()] = Z

Z

q () ddF (; e) ; a special case of (40) : In case
ii) dF (; e) = 0 for  2 [ (e) ;  (e)) or  2   (e) ;  (e) : Moreover, under the pair of schedules
(q () ; t ()) the agent rejects in case  2  ;  (e) and obtains no rent. Since Z

q^ () d < 0 for
 2  ;  (e), max
8><>:0;
Z

q^ () d
9>=>; = 0 in this case. So, expected utility can be written as in (40)
again. Finally, in case iii) dF (; e) = 0 for  2 [ (e) ;  (e)) and  2   (e) ;  (e), and moreover
Z

q^ () d  0 for all  such that dF (; e) > 0: Hence, (40) applies.
I now prove that (40) is equivalent to
E [u ()] = q ()
Z
(e)
F (; e) d +
Z

q ()F (; e) d:
The proof is trivial for case i) since  (e) =  in this case, which implies that E [u ()] =
Z

q ()F (; e) d as in the main model.
Case ii) In this case, I can write
(e)Z
(e)
max
8><>:0;
Z

q^ () d
9>=>; dF (; e) =
Z
(e)
Z

q^ () ddF (; e) +
Z

Z

q^ () ddF (; e) ;
since
(e)Z

max
8><>:0;
Z

q^ () d
9>=>; dF (; e) = 0: Switching from q^ () to q () ; I can write
(e)Z
(e)
max
8><>:0;
Z

q^ () d
9>=>; dF (; e) =
Z
(e)
0B@(   ) q () + Z

q () d
1CA dF (; e)+ Z

Z

q () ddF (; e) :
Noting that
Z
(e)
dF (; e) = F (; e), and that
Z
(e)
(   ) q () dF (; e) = q ()
Z
(e)
F (; e) d by an
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integration by parts, I can write
(e)Z
(e)
max
8><>:0;
Z

q^ () d
9>=>; dF (; e) = F (; e)
Z

q () d + q ()
Z
(e)
F (; e) d+
Z

Z

q () ddF (; e) :
Integrating the last term on the right-hand side of this expression by parts and simplifying, I obtain
F (; e)
Z

q () d + q ()
Z
(e)
F (; e) d + F
 
; e
 Z

q () d   F (; e)
Z

q () d +
Z

q ()F (; e) d
= q ()
Z
(e)
F (; e) d +
Z

q ()F (; e) d;
which is exactly (40) :
iii) In this case,
Z

q^ () d  0 for all  (e)     (e) and therefore I have
(e)Z
(e)
max
8><>:0;
Z

q^ () d
9>=>; dF (; e) =
(e)Z
(e)
Z

q () ddF (; e) : (41)
Integrating by parts, I obtain
(e)Z
(e)
Z

q () ddF (; e) =
Z
(e)
q () dF
 
 (e) ; e
  Z
(e)
q () dF ( (e) ; e) +
(e)Z
(e)
q ()F (; e) d (42)
Since F (; e) = 1 for  2  (e) ;  ; I can write Z
(e)
q () dF
 
 (e) ; e

=
Z
(e)
q ()F (; e) d: Since
F (; e) = 0 for  2 [;  (e)] ; I have
(e)Z

q ()F (; e) d = 0: Hence, I can write (42) as
(e)Z
(e)
Z

q () ddF (; e) =
Z

q ()F (; e) d:
Again because F (; e) = 0 for  2 [;  (e)] ; I have
(e)Z

F (; e) d =  
Z
(e)
F (; e) d =
Z
(e)
F (; e) d = 0;
so I can write
E [u ()] = q ()
Z
(e)
F (; e) d +
Z

q ()F (; e) d:
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Proof of Proposition 8. Since F ( (e) ; e) = 0 for all e; I can di¤erentiate totally and
have f ( (e) ; e) e (e) + Fe ( (e) ; e) = 0: At  (e) = ; I have Fe (; e) =  f (; e) e (e) > 0 since
e (e) < 0: Therefore, for a contract that implements a high e¤ort level ( > 0), production at the
top is going to be unusually high. A similar argument can be used to show that production at the
bottom is smaller than the Baron Myerson quantity for the case where  > 0:
Proof of Proposition 9. The proof is split into two parts. In part i I derive the properties
of the conditional expectation function. In part ii I use these properties to derive those of the ex
ante distribution of :
Part i: Properties of the conditional expectation function
From Milgrom (1981) it follows directly that @@
hi(js;i)
h(js;i) > 0 for s 2 (~s; s) impliesHi (j s; i) < 0
for s 2 (~s; s) : Likewise, @@ hi(js;i)h(js;i) < 0 for s 2 (s; ~s) implies Hi (j s; i) > 0 for s 2 (s; ~s) : Since
i (s; i) =  
Z

Hi (j s; i) d
this proves that
i (s; i) < 0 for s 2 (s; ~s) and i (s; i) > 0 for s 2 (~s; s) :
Finally, I show that i (s; i) = 0 for s 2 fs; ~s; sg : To see this, note that one can write for s 2 fs; ~s; sg
@
@
hi (j s; i)
h (j s; i) H (j s; i) = 0:
Integrating I have
Z

@
@
hi (j s; i)
h (j s; i) H (j s; i) d = 0:
Integrating by parts, I obtain
he
 

 s; i
h
 

 s; i  
Z

hi (j s; i)
h (j s; i) h (j s; i) d = 0:
Since h (j s; i) is a density for all i; I have
Z

hi (j s; i) d = 0: It follows that hi(js;i)h(js;i) = 0: From
@
@
hi(js;i)
h(js;i) = 0; it follows that
hi(js;i)
h(js;i) = 0: Finally, from the fact that h (j s; i) > 0 for all  it
follows that hi (j s; i) = 0 for all : Hence, for s 2 fs; ~s; sg  (s; i) is independent of i:
Part ii: Properties of F (; e) :
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Since l (i; e) has full support for all e; the distribution of  has a nonmoving support F (; e) =
08e and F  ; e = 18e. Hence Fe (; e) = Fe  ; e = 0. By the law of iterated expectations E =
E for all e: Since
R 

dF (; e) =    R 

F (; e) d; this is equivalent to
R 

Fe ( ; e) d = 08e:
By an integration by parts
F (; e) =
Z 1
0
Fi (; i) dL (i; e)
= Fi (; i)L (i; e)j10  
Z 1
0
 1i (; i)L (i; e) di;
since Fi (; i) is locally constant for  =2 [ (s; i) ;  (s; i)] : Taking derivatives with respect to e; since
L (1; e) = 18e; I have
Fe (; e) =  
Z 1
0
 1i (; i)Le (i; e) di
From part i, I have
i (; i) T 0,  S ~
and hence
Fe (; e) > 0 for  2

; ~

Fe (; e) < 0 for  2

~; 

:
Since Lee (i; e) and Le (i; e) have opposing signs for all i; I have also
Fee (; e) < 0 for  2

; ~

Fee (; e) > 0 for  2

~; 

:
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